personal control, then the Holy Spirit has fared only slightly better; in the guise of liberation theology it has been reduced to the status of primus inter pares in relation to causal agency on the human soul. The Catholic Church's Option for the Poor (1971) proclaims: . . . the Good news to the poor, freedom to the oppressed, and joy to the afflicted. The hope and forces which are moving the world in its very foundations are not foreign to the dynamism of the Gospel, which through the power of the Holy Spirit frees people from personal sin and from its consequences in social life. (# 5, O'Brien & Shannon, 1992, p. 288) This hope and these forces are contemporary social movements informed by modern social and political theory.
What is truly striking about the co-option of secular social science by the Catholic Church in explaining the human condition has been its repetition of the former's central failing: the seeming inability to portray or explain the bounds of autonomous subjectivity in anything other than the most logically contradictory of fashions. The following exhibits this failing quite clearly:
. . . the intention in using the term 'option' is to emphasize the freedom and commitment expressed in a decision. The commitment to the poor is not optional in the sense that a Christian is free to make or not to make this option, or commitment, to the poor, just as the love we owe to all human beings without exception is not optional. (Gutierrez, 1988, p. xxvi) The language of agency is more apparent, or strategic, than real.
The following deals with another creed, secular Marxism, but it is related to this general problematic. What are the intellectual conditions of possibility that allow a logically coherent description of lived modernity as, in the words of one author, a 'dialectic of liberty and discipline' (Wagner, 1994) ? Any reference to Marxism or psychology as if they were unified bodies of thought is of course impossible, but it may be necessary to define these terms in the most cursory of fashions. Marxism might be treated as the theory of social causation par excellence, the claim that human life and selfunderstanding is, in large measure, the outcome of the mode and method by which society produces its means of subsistence. Psychology might be treated in neo-Weberian terms, as allowing a theoretical space that negotiates a course of action based on information from incoming environmental stimuli. Psychology in this sense avoids characterizing that negotiation in terms of a pre-existing structure (personality) or negating its operations entirely (behaviourism). Rather, it might be seen as occupying an unstable locus of contradictory relations, or a collision of agency and constraint. Subjectivity is, on the one hand, agentic, and, on the other hand, limited, but very rarely capable of ambidextrous modes of expression. More usually, intellectual sleight of hand is detectable, in the shape of social constraints that reduce themselves to memory-traces within individual heads (Giddens, 1984) , or agency that is largely the product of 'habitus' (Bourdieu, 1977) . Equality and simultaneity always seem to elude our intellectual operations.
Several generations of commentators have of course attempted to fuse Marxism and psychology. However, their degree of cogency and success has been very much a moot point. The following is an attempt to offer some lines of demarcation on the possibility, or otherwise, of a 'Marxist psychology', whatever that might be or whatever that might encompass. One of the most recent substantial contributions to this debate in the UK gave the opinion that Marxism and psychology are incapable of being unified and may not even be amenable to a policy of peaceful co-existence (Parker & Spears, 1996) .
Whatever the ultimate truth of such a statement, there are three, very broadly speaking, possible points of departure or positioning for a 'Marxist psychology' (spatial metaphors may be the most useful shorthand in describing this relation). First, there is a psychology based centrally on the human potentiality of Marx's early writings. Such an approach is best exemplified by Lucien Sève (1978) and the Berlin School of critical psychology (combining the rather eclectic combination of humanism and biologism that is to be found in Marx's early writings). Second, there is a psychology that occupies or pursues a supplementary role in relation to a classical Marxist (read economistic) analysis. The latter has tended to predominate, perhaps the most famous candidate being psychoanalysis (Marcuse, 1969; Reich, 1972) . There are of course sub-variants. Fromm (1942) adds European existentialism and some general social-psychological musings that generally go under the name of 'scapegoat theory'. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950/1969) throw in Weber's rationalization hypothesis for good measure. However, the contribution of psychoanalytic Marxism is well known and well documented (e.g. Wolfenstein, 1993) , and we shall not discuss it further here. Third, there is the psychology that occupies or mediates the theoretical space between the famous duality of base and superstructure. It is the parameters of this psychology that constitute our primary focus: the psychology of hegemony, a psychology that hardly dared speak its name until the baleful influence of Leninism had been removed, or, alternatively, it had become a phantasmic, Derridean signifier (Laclau, 1985) . This is the psychology that attempts to explicate the mode and manner in which the ideas of the ruling economic class are, in every epoch, the dominant Weltanschauung of the age. It might immediately be objected that psychoanalytic Marxism could as easily be accommodated within the third aspect of our rather rudimentary classification. However, that would be to miss the point. Marxian psychoanalysis was never able to reconcile its 'dual system' approach, a point never better demonstrated than in the tortuous deliberations of Marcuse on the historical origination of the Oedipus complex, the role of sublimation in the productive process and repression within existent social institutions. Like the thing in itself, the point of osmosis never arrives. Such an interjection may also obscure the cardinal contention of this piece, namely that the concept of hegemony has functioned as a marker, an IOU, the promissory note of a social science that has singularly failed to deliver the mode and manner in which a socially embedded economic formation impels, induces or suppresses subjective 'ideological' acceptance.
The Gramscian cultural industry has of course been supplanted by the Foucauldian, but the replacement of hegemony by the 'reproduction of social practices' might be reckoned a case of substituting one obscurantism for another, for it has functioned in entirely the same fashion, that is, as a 'bracketing device' that allows the conjunction of 'carceral institution' and 'discourse' (ideology even more broadly conceived) to be subject to indefinite postponement. To put it crudely, the mode and manner in which disciplinary social practices 'produce' discourse never seems to arrive. Even though the shift of vocabulary allowed a seamless transformation from hegemonic domination to the discursive containment of subjectivity and probably contributed to the success of the latter, the 'logic' of the problem remains exactly the same, namely that 'the third thing', the moment of a social scientific 'transcendental schematism', never finally emerges. The point where base/superstructure, power/knowledge, merge, the mechanisms of their osmosis, are never subject to rational exegesis. They are intimated but never demonstrated. They remain night and day, rather than the dusk of Hegel' s 'owl of Minerva'.
It must be conceded that, from its very inception, Marxism was very much a productivist ontology, the materialization of Fichte's self-positing I, in the 'species-being' of the Paris Manuscripts of 1844 (Rockmore, 1980) . Marx had a very definite conception of the human if not the psyche, a conception that runs through the entire gamut of his work, conceptually and chronologically, a point even Althusser had ultimately to concede. It should hardly need to be pointed out that any concept of alienation begs the question 'Alienation from what?' The answer, of course, is species-being, a concept seemingly rooted in the biological potentiality of the human species. Modern industrial practices had freed the human species from its daily toil to sustain its material continuance in a hostile world (Marx was a Stakhanovite; there is heroism in labour). Marx had taken on board Hegel's famous saying from the Wissenschaft der Logik that systematic philosophy itself presupposed that the human species had elevated itself by its efforts from the clutches of material scarcity. To be truly human, to be truly free, is possible only in the era of 'Prometheus unbound'.
Reading the early Marx, one is left wondering whether Marxism needs biology rather more than psychology. If essentialism of whatever kind is a crime, then the early Marx at least is guilty as charged. A hunger for a theoretical supplement may have fed psychoanalytic Marxism but it was also THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13(4) 472 the overpowering emphasis on labour as the central defining characteristic of the human that was the initial impetus to the Habermasian attempt to supplement the theory of labour with a theory of communicative interaction. This has hardly enjoyed universal acclaim; the attempt to provide transcendental grounds for the ideal speech situation was only, at best, a qualified success. Habermasian commentators refer to a 'quasi-transcendental' grounding of communicative interaction (Benhabib, 1986) . What is striking about Marx's eloquent but vehement assertions on human productive ontology is his absolute confidence:
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion, or by anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. (Marx, 1846 (Marx, /1977a Two millennia of human thought on 'the human condition' are summarily dismissed. Humans are as humans make. The aura of infallibility pervades the text. Marx may have learned a great deal from Hegel but he learned as much from Fichte (1797 Fichte ( /1982 . First principles are incapable of being proved by their very nature; they can only be accepted or rejected. That is as true for a materialist as an idealist ontology. The primacy of production thesis receives very little in the way of supporting argumentation, but the lack of an adequate theory of human subjectivity was to be even more apparent in the classical texts of later Marxism, where the boundaries of human potentiality were replaced by a laissez-faire attitude to human agency altogether.
Autonomy and Heteronomy: The Classical Marxian Formulation and the Negation of Human Subjectivity
The early Marx clearly understood the question of human subjectivity from within some form of Aristotelian teleological framework. It is in the later works that some form of causal link between mode of production and human subjectivity is proposed. It is this claim that necessitates a mode of transmission, 'a third thing' akin to transcendental schemata, that unites the material base and the ideological superstructure. Much ink has been spilled over that question. The history of Marxism is the history of that imputed relationship. Imputed but never demonstrated. Some of the difficulty lies in the systematically constructed vagueness of the classical formulation of the Marxist project itself.
The general result at which I arrived and which, once won, served as a guiding thread for my studies, can be briefly formulated as follows: In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which MATHER: HEGEMONY AND MARXIST PSYCHOLOGY 473 correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. (Marx, 1859 (Marx, /1977b The ambiguity that lies at the very heart of Marxism can be located in the last three sentences of the above. In this case, the translator (David McLellan) has accurately rendered the three crucial terms Marx uses to describe the relationship between economic base and human (self-) consciouness. These three terms are italicized in the following original German.
Die Gesammtheit dieser Produktionsverhältnisse bildet die ökonomische Struktur der Gesellschaft, die reale Basis, worauf sich ein juristischer und politischer Ueberbau erhebt, und welcher bestimmte gesellschaftliche Bewusstseinsformen entsprechen. Die Produktionsweise des materiellen Lebens bedingt den socialen, politischen und geistigen Lebensprocess uberhaupt. Es ist nicht das Bewusstsein der Menschen, das ihr Sein sondern umgekehrt ihr gesellschaftliches Sein, das ihr Bewusstsein bestimmt. (Marx, 1859 (Marx, /1992 It is inconceivable that a man of Marx's intelligence would not realize the quite fundamental ambiguity that lies at the heart of this formulation. The first sentence introduces the idea of a relationship, a 'corresponding' (entsprechen). The second asserts a causal relationship (bedingen). Such a relationship does not preclude the possibility of mutual reciprocal interaction, even if a causal primacy must be ceded to the base (and even that is arguable if considered solely in relation to the above). However, the third most definitely does. The term employed by Marx is unambiguous-base determines (bestimmen) superstructure.
It may be the case that twentieth-century Marxism was conditioned (or should that be determined?) by the quite fundamental refusal of Marx to specify this relationship. It has been the Scylla and Charybdis of Marxist scholarship but the issue is incapable of resolution. Both positions, base conditions/base determines, have textual warrant. These are qualitatively different claims despite the theoretical contortions of many generations of Marxist commentators to somehow reconcile them. The idea of a determination 'only in the last instance' has neither textual support nor good sense. But the claim that base conditions superstructure seems to undermine the distinctive nature of Marxism. Marx: if the direction of the explanatory tie is as he laid down, then the best account of the nature of the tie is that it is a functional one. . . . Construing his explanations as functional makes for compatibility between the causal power of the explained phenomena and their secondary status in the order of explanation. (Cohen, 1978, p. 278) There may be good reasons for supposing that functionalism might be reckoned a prime candidate in reconciling base/superstructure or at least providing a mode of rational reconstruction that makes such a reconciliation possible. First, Marx does use functionalist arguments to explain certain discrete phenomena (e.g. unemployment), and Marxists frequently have recourse, consciously or unconsciously, to functionalist modes of exposition and critique. Second, functionalism does allow a primacy thesis to be maintained while fully acknowledging the 'fact' that superstructures also determine/condition base. (Talcott Parsons' famous argument concerning the 'fit' between the modern industrial order and the nuclear family follows a similar mode of argumentation.)
The primary difficulty only really manifests itself, however, when Cohen (1978) begins to refer to ideological belief-systems:
. . . and on that point there are traces in Marx of a Darwinian mechanism, a notion that thought systems are produced in comparative independence from social constraint, but persist and gain social life following a filtration process which selects those well adapted for ideological service. . . . there is a kind of 'ideological pool' which yields elements in different configurations as social requirements change. (p. 291) This is a biological metaphor too far, and Cohen knows it. For we are immediately informed that the individual can put these thought systems to novel use, Cohen referring to the 'delicacy of intellectual constructions' (p. 291). These, presumably, replace the hardwiring of the 'ideological pool'. The over-socialized conception of humans has been replaced by Darwinian dopes who are the functionalized recipients of an ideological filtration process. The crucial point is how, to use Cohen's own words, 'the functional fact operates through the minds of agents' (p. 289), but of this he says nothing.
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At least Cohen wrestles with the difficulty; mainstream Marxist commentators have simply assumed that some vague intimation of base having a disproportionate level of influence over superstructure that is not reciprocated can somehow save Marx from sociological dilution and yet avoid the vagaries of economic determinism. Again, the two statements on the base/ superstructure relationship are qualitatively opposed to one another. For the purposes of a 'Marxist psychology', or if such a psychology is to be tenable, the relationship between base and superstructure must be conceived as that of a mutual 'conditioning'. The economic base is the primary causal influence on human socio-cultural production and interaction, but that does not preclude the possibility of autonomous creativity in regard to that activity. The alternative-base as determining superstructure-has, so far, occasioned two possibilities. The first is Pavlov's dog. The second is the 'dead dog' (as Lessing described him) of Spinoza's Marx-Louis Althusser. Treat base and superstructure (Marx's apparent causal injunctions on their relationship notwithstanding) as irreducible attributes of the one substance. Allow both a determining (or 'interpellating') role in 'the process without a subject'. Learn to love the necessity of structural determination and the constitution of 'subjectivity' therein. These are the only alternatives that a determinist reading of Marxism has yet produced. They are the outcome of a Marxism that completely dispenses with any notion of 'psychical autonomy' or psychological space.
Such a treatment has recently been offered by Augoustinos (1999) . Once more the reading of the base/superstructure relation is critical: 'All forms of consciousness, such as ideas, beliefs and ideology, are socially and historically determined by the existing material conditions and constituent social relations within a society' (Augoustinos, 1999, p. 298) . From that reading emerges the claim that 'ideology' is an emergent property of capitalist social relations. In actual fact, this reading of Marxism is more akin to a Durkheimian reading of Marx on ideology than an Althusserian one ('commodity fetishism' being our 'collective conscience', so to speak). It allows the author to criticize the cognitive and psychological treatments of false consciousness offered by authors such as Jost (1995) , but at the cost of dispensing with any notion of consciousness as a psychological/cognitive phenomenon (Wetherell, 1999, p. 403) .
The result is encapsulated in the following: 'Mystification, then, is embedded in the very nature of capitalist society, in reality itself, and not in the minds of people' (Augoustinos, 1999, p. 305) . The most obvious point is the mode and manner of how 'mystification' can be asserted to be intrinsic to any set of social relations minus some sort of cognitive/intellectual assessment of those relations as precisely mystificatory. The author may have created an ontological/epistemological hell for those atheistic Marxists who wish to pry into 'mysteries'. Second, it is at least contentious to assert that the concept of 'commodity fetishism' can be so totally divorced from THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13(4) 476 the earlier concept of alienation with its more overtly psychological overtones. There may be some conceptual development, but 'the two Marx thesis' implicit in such a position would require an extended defence. Goldberg (1999) comes up with a similarly deterministic reading of Marx:
If, as Marx seems to suggest, ideology is part of the 'ensemble of social relations' which determines consciousness, then the subject's consciousness will function such that the person's beliefs and values will converge with the material economic conditions that called it into being. Here the power of ideology lies not in affecting people's mind, but in providing the content that literally 'makes up' people's minds; while at the same time convincing them that they come to their views with a free and open will and the capacity of choice. (p. 355) Once again, Spinozist Marxism:
. . . men think themselves as free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and appetites, and as they are ignorant of the causes by which they are led to seek and will, they do not even dream of their existence. (Spinoza, 1677 (Spinoza, /1989 There is textual warrant for such a position but the problems seem intractable even if the epistemologically privileged standpoint of Marxism is deemed acceptable. The reader is (presumably) being invited to think the pure exteriority of the commodified world, an invitation that was difficult enough in the structuralist moment of thinking the exteriority of the symbolic form (Lévi-Strauss, early Foucault), but conscious access to a mysterious and extraneous commodified reality finally raises Spinoza's first principle, 'God or substance'. The only other alternative is the positing of an absolute transcendence. This is why such readings of Marx often read as metaphysical monism-thought, beliefs, ideology, can only be an attribute of the one substance, 'commodified reality'; presumably their occupation of space fulfils Spinoza's other attribute, extension. That is the inevitable outcome of such readings of Marx.
Psychical Interiority and Dialectical Logic
This is not to say that the world of human agency is not saturated with the commodity form; merely that the moment of psychical interiority cannot be completely discarded without recourse to the above mode of argumentation. Neither does it commit one to the claim that such readings have no warrant or are logically inconsistent. They have at least a degree of textual warrant, and Spinozist Marxism exhibits as much 'intellectual rigour' as any other reading of Marx. Nor does it entail that the unpalatable dispensing of any notion of genuine autonomy concomitant with such a position may not be indicative of an actual state of affairs.
However, the following is concerned with examining whether Marxism requires some conception of the psychological if some form of agentic discourse is to be maintained under conditions of commodity fetishism. It is that psychological space with which hegemony is concerned. This is perhaps one of the most fascinating aspects of the history of the post-war debate on Gramsci in general and hegemony in particular. The primary reason for the lack of agreement on the nature of the concept itself has been the explicit failure of commentators to acknowledge the, admittedly implicit, psychology that underlies hegemony itself. For this very reason, commentators have often attempted to define hegemony by a process of negative determination, and it is no great surprise that they have generally concluded with an evocation of a collective psychology akin to Rousseau's 'general will', a continuation of the path 'from Rousseau to Lenin' (Colletti, 1972) .
This difficulty has of course been compounded by other factors, most notably the undoubted fact that hegemony is a 'speculative concept' in the Hegelian sense-a conceptual determination that simultaneously affirms and negates difference. The classic example is, of course, the first triad of the Science of Logic (1812/1969, p. 16), Being, Nothing, Becoming. Here Hegel discusses the possibility of making ontological determinations at the most abstract level. Conceptual thinking at this level necessitates the usage of the famous speculative proposition. The structures of conventional language cannot capture the sublated duality that lies at the heart of conceptual thinking. Those structures have been no more successful in capturing the sublated duality of dominance and acquiescence that lies at the heart of the Gramscian concept of hegemony-'the levels of force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization' (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 169-70) ; the moment where particular sectional interests become universal, 'creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group [class] over a series of subordinate groups' (p. 182); a moment that unites ideal and material factors: 'if hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic ' (p. 161) .
The industry of Gramsci commentary that has flourished has produced extremely able and informative commentaries (Boggs, 1984; Femia, 1981; Mouffe, 1979 , to name but three). But they have failed to grasp the real nature of Gramsci's Hegelianism. It lies not in Croce or the appropriation of the concept of civil society but in the very language of hegemony itself. The debate on whether Gramsci was a totalitarian (an 'authentic Leninist', if this term be preferred) or a liberal Eurocommunist (Femia, 1981, ch. 5 gives a good summary) completely misses the point. Gramsci is a contradictory thinker simply because he believes that conveying economic or political reality in the broadest sense necessitates the usage of speculative propositions-hegemonic classes dominate and acquiesce, lead and are led, have particular and universal interests, and so on, and so on. Without dialectical logic, and its attendant speculative propositions, hegemony is a THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13 (4) 478 simple, and terminal, case of self-contradiction, a point that will be further discussed below.
However, it must be noted that this has further consequences, not least that causal effects are notoriously problematic within Hegelian logic. Ceding causal primacy to either a 'material base' or even 'a fundamental class' may not be available utilizing such a conceptual system. Gramsci (1971) , criticizing F.A. Lange's classic text The History of Materialism, writes that historical materialism should not commence 'from the dogmatic presupposition that historical materialism is straightforward traditional materialism slightly revised and corrected (corrected by the "dialectic", which therefore becomes absorbed as a chapter of formal logic and not as a logic of its own) ' (p. 456) . But this leaves hegemony without a point of fixity. The fundamental antinomy of Antonio Gramsci is the insistence on the following:
One could say in a sense, I think, that the philosophy of praxis equals Hegel plus David Ricardo. The problem should be presented thus at the outset: are the new methodological canons introduced by Ricardo in the science of economics to be considered as merely instrumental values (alternatively as a new chapter of formal logic), or do they have significance as a philosophical innovation? The discovery of the formal logical principle of 'the law of tendency' which leads to the scientific definition of the fundamental economic concepts of homo oeconomicus and of the 'determined market', was this not also a discovery of epistemological value as well? Does it not necessarily imply a new 'immanence', a new conception of 'necessity' and 'freedom' etc.? Translation into these terms seems to me precisely the achievement of the philosophy of praxis, which has universalized Ricardo's discoveries, extending them in an adequate fashion to the whole of history and thus drawing from them, in an original form, a new conception of the world. (pp. 400-401)
The above does not do credit to a theorist of Gramsci's reputation. Hegel + David Ricardo may strike the reader as a rather bizarre combination. The claim seems to be that Newtonian causal laws should only be utilized when shorn of their mechanistic characteristics and replaced with the immanent dialectics of determinate negation. That may, or may not, be legitimate, but it is most definitely disingenuous, for it allows the retention of a semblance of an economic causal analysis, or at least the rhetoric thereof, while completely disavowing the conception of 'science' that lies at its basis. Such an understanding is confirmed by the following from Letters from Prison: 'the law of causality of the natural sciences has been cleansed of its mechanical aspect and has been synthetically identified with Hegelian dialectical reasoning' (Gramsci, 1975 , cited by Paggi, 1979 . There is no possible point of such linkage, as Hegel's infamous comments on Newton in The Philosophy of Nature (1817/1970) make clear. The remarks on Newton are adequate testimony to the incompatibility of dialectical logic and the imputation of causality as understood in the natural sciences. These rather embarrassing remarks might be safely be left to the mice (as Marx once remarked of The German Ideology) if they were borne in mind by those who would propagate 'dialectical' or speculative social theorycausal and affective relationships make no sense on the basis of dialectical logic. Hegemony is a speculative concept in the Hegelian sense, expressible only in and through speculative propositions, but it remains tied to a logic of the social that still wishes to assign primacy to one element (material base) over another. Gramsci attempts both intellectual operations simultaneously, but there are sound reasons for supposing that hegemonic synthesis entails two irreducibly distinct moments; that is, hegemony as a speculative concept and hegemony as a synthesis of two qualitatively opposed realms or spheres of operation that require unification in a 'third thing' akin to the transcendental schemata of Kantian philosophy.
In Hegelian terms, a truly 'speculative' approach requires the abandonment of what Hegel terms Vorstellung (very roughly, understood as 'picturethinking'). But that precisely is how hegemony has been approached as a unit of socio-political analysis-imagine or picture a material base based on commodity production, imagine or picture an ideological sphere suffused with the logic of that production. The picture can only be completed by something that is neither purely material (in having a fixed spatial location) nor purely ideal (in that it is not the product of autonomous thought but the result, somehow, of processes in the material base). That is the Kantian problematic of unifying concept and intuition, but the overall logical problem is best summarized by Fichte (1797 Fichte ( /1982 in his early system: In a boundless space, A put light at a point m, and at a point n, darkness: then, given that the space is continuous, and there is no hiatus between m and n, there must necessarily be a point o somewhere between the two, which is both light and darkness; a contradiction.-Set between the two a middle condition, twilight. If it stretch from p to q, then at p the twilight will march with light, and at q with darkness. But by this you have gained only a respite; the contradiction has not been satisfactorily resolved. Twilight is a mixture of light and darkness. Now at p the daylight can only march with the twilight, in that p is at once light and twilight; and thus (since twilight only differs from light in being also darkness) in that is at once both light and darkness. Similarly at q. (p. 138) A true understanding of the concept of hegemony requires the abandonment of such forms of thinking, the shift from reflective idealism to speculative idealism that The Phenomenology of Spirit was intended to herald and accomplish.
That is a very long story indeed, but for Hegel concepts are not merely subjective-ideal items; they incorporate within themselves subjectivity and objectivity, claims concerning the existences of objects-in-themselves being self-refuting (in the sense that such objects are themselves the product of conceptual determination). This is not the moment of triumphal rationalism THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13 (4) 480 that Anglo-American philosophy has generally taken it to be, however (Taylor, 1975) . For Hegel, any concept is a determination of the absolute concept (Reason itself, or the concept of the concept). The Science of Logic (1812 Logic ( /1969 ) asks the question 'What is thought?' The only addressee can be autonomous and spontaneous thought itself. It is the process of thought thinking itself (or, to be more accurate, the categories of modernity thinking themselves) that Hegelian logic attempts to capture. That is a quite impossible task, a point that Hegel concedes almost from the outset. Autonomous thought can only know itself via its own determinations, any one determination being a finite presentation of a process of spontaneous thinking itself. It is Hegel's contention that inadequacies in successive determinations of the nature of conceptual thinking by conceptual thinking itself lead to the situation described in the Logic; that is, the increasingly self-conscious awareness on the part of thought that any instance of thought (a concept) only exhibits a particularized and finite aspect of reality. Insofar as reality is characterized by the said concept, it is only a partial and inadequate representation of that reality, thought being pushed on to develop further determinations to grasp more adequately the nature of reality itself. It is the nature of that inadequacy that Hegel describes as 'dialectical'.
The Science of Logic purports to demonstrate that every conceptual determination can only operate by the (usually) surreptitious employment of its opposite determination; an actual concept always fails to positively identify itself without its opposite determination (the most famous example is the concept of being, which can only actualize itself via the opposing determination of nothingness). Real thinking, as opposed to the timeless abstractions of formal logic, operates by this embryonic process of existence that leads, so Hegel believes, to more adequate conceptual selfdetermination. Ontological determinations always involve that process, a process that the operation of formal logic or 'reflective idealism' always ignores or precludes. An ontological determination of identity must include within itself, albeit implicitly, a determination of non-identity. The alternative, a fixed law of identity (A = A), is subject to a devastating Hegelian critique described by Andreas Sarlejmin in his unjustly neglected Hegel's Dialectic (1971) . No proof can be given of this law; identity itself is either presupposed, rendering it an empty or useless tautology, or given a determinate content that Hegel argues involves identity in difference.
It is our contention that hegemony fulfils all the requirements of being a 'speculative concept' in the Hegelian sense. It is a conceptual determination that always involves its opposite determination. It simultaneously affirms dominance and acquiescence, leadership and learning, and so on. Furthermore, as a conceptual determination, it can only be expressed as a speculative proposition. Hegemony is socio-cultural leadership, and hegemony is not socio-cultural leadership. Speculative propositions are the inimical form of proposition to the process of conceptual determination described above. A mode of expression must be found that expresses both the adequacy of the concept, in relation to its positive determination, and its inadequacy, in that it always involves its opposite determination. In short, the identity between a subject and a predicate must be viewed, simultaneously, as an assertion of non-identity: 'the general nature of the subject or proposition, which involves the distinction of subject and predicate, is destroyed by the speculative proposition, and the proposition of identity which the former becomes contains the counter-thrust against that subjectpredicate relationship' (Hegel, 1807 (Hegel, /1977 . To assert the union of subject and predicate is to assert their disunion; that is, the fundamental nature of speculative propositions. Many of Marx's insights require the use of speculative propositions: human labour-power is a commodity like any other (under conditions of alienated, capitalist labour); human labour is not a commodity like any other (in that it is indicative of the fundamental 'species-being' of humankind).
Hegemony and Phenomenological Contradiction
It is unquestionably the case that many social commentators have utilized the concept of hegemony without the intellectual tumult of reading Hegel or understanding dialectical logic, and, it might be immediately added, without subjecting their readers thereto. It is also the case that several extant treatments of hegemony in the psychological literature make reference to hegemony in such a way as to render it both more accessible and capable of producing genuine social/psychological insight. They also retain some notion of agency. The difficulty with these treatments lies precisely in the notion that hegemony is a 'contradictory lived experience'.
Such treatments, however illuminating, raise the question of whether Gramsci would recognize them as instances of the concept of hegemony itself. This is a very long story indeed, but the detachment of hegemony from the economic base, and the concomitant avowal of the autonomy of the cultural moment (to put it crudely, 'the superstructure'), is, to say the least controversial. Marx and Gramsci understand the relation as 'dialectical' (even if they wish to retain some notion of causal primacy or even if such a relation is ultimately untenable). There has been a rather uncritical acceptance of the reading offered by the 'cultural studies industry', where the concept of hegemony is suspended from nothing in heaven and supported by nothing on earth. Without dialectical logic, the difficulty of ascribing contradictory predicates to the same subject yields problems of intelligibility and lucidity. Hegemony is not solely fragmentary in the sense that these authors describe it, that is, as lived experience; it is experienced simultaneously as a synthetic whole. There is an over-emphasis on fluidity, ambiguity, negotiation, precisely because the moment of simultaneous unity within THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 13(4) 482 extended fashion. Both authors rehearse the problematic of what we initially termed the 'boundaries of spontaneous agency', the problematic of how to avoid treating people as 'cultural (ideological) dopes' or completely autonomous agents.
But Wetherell and Edley simply reproduce the dilemma in changed form. In this guise hegemony (in relation to masculinity) amounts to Garfinkelian man choosing from a range of possibilities 'allowed' or 'discursively constituted' by Foucauldian discursive practices. Billig (1991) , though not engaging in a sustained treatment of Gramsci, tends to view hegemony in an overtly intellectualistic fashion: 'Gramsci suggested that philosophy shapes the common sense of the common person, as the ideology's hegemony is fashioned around philosophical principles' (p. 7). Gramsci does so describe hegemony in certain places, but it remains a partial description. In both cases, the moment of economic constraint within the generalized agency/ constraint problematic becomes discursively reconstituted, or, rather, becomes reconstituted as discursive constraint.
Hegemony: An End to the Strategies of Avoidance
The preceding has argued that Gramsci operates with two concepts of hegemony: one that is a truly dialectical concept; and one that attempts to maintain a primary causal link between economic base and ideology or selfconsciousness. Or, rather, he asserts a linkage between 'Hegelian dialectical reasoning' and 'the law of causality' that he nowhere proves, nor, we would suggest, can prove. This is why a fundamental distinction must be drawn between hegemony as a unit of conceptual 'logic' or theoretical item and how Gramsci actually operationalizes that concept in explaining social circumstances.
What is hegemony? A concept that claims simultaneously to affirm and deny universality/particularity; dominance and acquiescence, and so on, and so on. But the analysis of hegemony as 'lived experience' or an item of real political analysis can only function as a causal event experienced by agents in their everyday lives (i.e. insofar as hegemony ceases to be a speculative concept in the Hegelian sense). There is a fundamental hiatus within the concept itself, or, rather, with the concept as 'theory' and the concept as utilized. It is for this very reason that closure on the nature of the concept has not been possible. It can only 'do' if it undermines what it 'is'; it only 'is' insofar as it denies the possibility of what it does (assert a causal link). This has also rendered hegemony vulnerable to intellectual reconstitution, a reconstitution that our own analysis seems to justify. But hegemony without the decisive moment of the economic is not hegemony, however its linkage with the moment of ideology is conceived. Gramsci cannot be (post)-modernized.
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That, precisely, is why hegemony understood either as the saturation of the commodity form or as the rule of an economically dominant class must be the product of a causal agent (commodity production under conditions of alienated labour). If the causal agent is the economic base, and we wish to make reference to the fashion in which this causal agent impinges on the very structure of rationality itself, then some form of commitment to the individual as the locus of that rationality is at least justified. In plain English, we need some concept of consciousness or the psyche as the seat or the origination of that rationality. Hegemony as a concrete form of social analysis must become a form of Marxist psychology that explains the pernicious success of the market penetration of the psyche itself. And this raises the vexed question, once more, of the mode and manner of 'the reproduction of social practices'. By what mode and manner does the particularistic 'logic of capital' become perceived or experienced as 'universal rationality' (commodity fetishism) itself? The question is unanswerable without some model of human agency and its malleability. This also indicates why the Foucauldian 'cultural studies industry' was able to supplant the Gramscian 'cultural studies industry' with such consummate ease (or, to be more accurate, why they continually alternate between these two positions). Foucault's problematic is entirely the same: by what mode and manner does the particularistic logic of the disciplinary society become inimical with rationality itself? Foucault sought to drive out agentic discourse but it would return with a vengeance. An object (discipline) is an object only for a subject. That is equally true of the commodity.
